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Thailand’s Middle-Income Trap: Firms’ 
Technological Upgrading and 
Innovation and Government Policies
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Once recognized as a high-performing newly industrializing 
economy, Thailand is currently in the middle-income trap. The 
country has remained at the middle-income level for more than 
15 years. A major reason for such development is a relatively low 
technological learning of firms in Thailand. After a financial crisis in 
1997, certain improvements transpired; for example, transnational 
corporations and large local firms started to invest increasingly in 
building rather sophisticated technological capabilities in product 
and process design, advanced engineering, and R&D. However, 
Thailand is still lacking a critical mass of innovative firms, which 
can pull the country out of the trap. On the government side, 
perpetuated ineffective science, technology, and innovation policies 
have been implemented for several decades. 
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I. Introduction
From the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, Thailand had been recognized 
as a high-performing Asian newly industrializing economy (NIE); this 
country could be successful in industrial catching up with the West, 
similar to the experiences of Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. 
Thailand experienced double-digit growth in its gross domestic product 
(GDP) and diversified its economy, which comprises various agriculture 
and manufacturing products and thriving services, especially tourism. 
Nonetheless, the country faced a major economic crisis in 1997. 
Although the economic situation had improved within a few years 
afterward, the country’s long-term growth rate and competitiveness as 
a once-rising star and labor-intensive products (e.g., textile, shoes, and 
clothing) had declined substantially. Simultaneously, Thailand failed 
to climb up the technological ladder to produce additional knowledge-
intensive products and services. These conditions caused growing 
concerns among Thai policymakers; recently, the general public believed 
that Thailand is nearly falling into the middle-income trap1 because 
the country has been at the upper-middle-income level for 15 years 
until 2018 and still remains unable to reach the high-income economic 
status. The situation in Thailand is similar to those of neighboring 
Asian countries in Southeast Asia, such as Malaysia (see Wong 2019 on 
this special issue).
This paper aims to explain why Thailand is in the middle-income 
trap from the perspective of technological upgrading. First, the overall 
industrial development and the middle-income trap faced by Thailand 
is summarized. Second, the two important factors behind Thailand’s 
middle-income trap are highlighted. These factors are presented as 
follows: 1) the lack of firms’ technological upgrading and innovation and 
2) the highly ineffective science, technology, and innovation (STI) policy 
habits.
1 By analyzing historical income transitions, the threshold number of years for 
a country to be in the middle-income trap is calculated. This cut-off value is the 
median number of years that countries spend in the lower middle-income and 
in the upper middle-income groups. A threshold of 14 years to cross the upper 
middle-income to high income (USD5,000 to USD11,750) was computed (Felipe 
et al. 2014) 
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II. Overview of Thailand’s Industrial Development
Thailand was once recognized as a high-performing Asian economy. 
Its economic growth rate from the 1960s to the 1990s impressively 
exceeded 7%. A high average economic growth contributes to the 
increase in the well-being of Thai people in general. A steady increase 
in real wages in all economic sectors had occurred from 1984 to 2010. 
Many people were lifted out of poverty. Approximately 40% of the 
population has escaped poverty in only nearly one generation from 
1986 to 2010 (25 years) (Jitsuchon 2014).
Thailand’s industrialization can be divided into three periods as 
follows: import substitution (late 1950s–1970s), export promotion 
(1980s–mid1990s), and liberalization (late 1990s onward). The 
aquiculture sector contribution to the GDP had considerably reduced 
from 44% in 1951 to 8.7% in 2015, while the share of manufacturing 
increased markedly from 13% to 27.5% during the same period. In 
terms of export, while the role of primary products had declined relative 
to that of manufacturing, agriculture itself had diversified remarkably 
because Thailand became one of the world’s top exporter of extensive 
primary or primary-based products, including rice, rubber, sugar, 
cassava, prawns, and canned pineapple. Simultaneously, manufactured 
exports displayed impressive growth and diversification in sectors 
ranging from textiles to automobiles and parts and to electronic and 
electrical components. For example, the export shares of electronic 
and automotive products have increased from 0.04 and 0.25 in 1970 
to 25.20 and 6.68 in 2006, respectively (Yusuf and Nabeshima 2009). 
Thailand’s economic status changed from low-income to upper-
middle-income country since 2003. Behind this success lies prudent 
macroeconomic management, early adoption of export and foreign 
direct investment (FDI) promotion policies, investment in physical 
infrastructure, and expansion of school and university enrolment (World 
Bank 1993).
Nonetheless, several scholars, such as Kunio (1988), have strongly 
questioned the sustainability of Thailand’s economic prosperity. This 
author described the Thai economy as “ersatz capitalism.” In contrast 
to Western countries, Japan, and first-tier East Asian NIEs, the Thai 
economy grew by overcoming its bottlenecks with foreign technology 
and capital without expending serious efforts to increase its own 
saving and upgrade technology. This author believed that this type of 
110 SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
capitalism cannot constantly expand. Kunio’s prediction came true 
when the country experienced a major economic crisis in 1997. Since 
then, the economic growth rates have decreased substantially to 3%–4% 
annually and even further down to 2%–3% on average after 2014 when 
the military took over the country. This growth rate has become the 
new normal for Thailand. The country’s once rising-star and labor-
intensive sectors, such as textile, garments, toys, and shoes have lost 
their competitive edge to low-wage countries. Concern on the middle-
income trap has been spreading among Thai policymakers, scholars, 
and the public. 
Specifically, concern is raised about the limited intensity of 
technology development in the industry, which has contributed to such 
a competitive weakness. This circumstance is reflected in several key 
economic indicators, especially on the growth of total factor productivity 
(TFP). The growth in TFP explains other reasons for a country’s 
economic growth beyond the growth of capital, labor, and land. In 
addition to education and other social capital and institutional factors 
(e.g., entrepreneurship and trust), TFP includes the progress of STI. 
Although Thailand’s economic growth rate in the past 50 years is rather 
impressive, this rate has been achieved largely by using factor inputs. 
From 1987 to1995, the Thai economy grew at the rate of nearly 10%, 
whereas the TFP growth rate was only approximately 1.5% (National 
Economic and Social Development Board [NESDB] 2007a). 
The Thai economy is rather unique in Southeast Asia because no 
class of indigenous big business entrepreneurs exists in the country. 
Even small businesses in Bangkok, especially in retailing, are mostly 
owned and operated by Sino-Thais (East Asian Analytical Unit 1995, 
p 78). According to GEM, Bangkok University, and BUSEM (2012), 
Thailand has a high rate of entrepreneurial activity. “Necessity-based” 
entrepreneurship (i.e., where people become entrepreneurs because they 
must survive economically) is prevalent (such as in the case of street 
vendors), but the existence of a critical mass of “opportunity-based” 
entrepreneurs who seize and execute risky opportunities through 
innovations is uncertain. This opportunity-based entrepreneurship is 
typically an important characteristic of successful startups. Innovation 
surveys show that risk-taking attitude is rather low among Thai 
entrepreneurs, although this attitude has improved in recent surveys. 
Thai traditional wisdom emphasizes conforming to existing societal 
values and the ideas of elders rather than challenging them.
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In terms of trust, Chinese-owned businesses tend to be built as 
family-affiliated corporations that allow ownership- and kinship-led 
rather than skill-based management. This “family-ownership-control-
type business” (Suehiro 1992, p 392), which is characterized by low 
stock ownership diffusion and added family-related chief executive 
officers (CEOs), has led to business and joint investment co-operation 
among different companies within the same family affiliates but to 
only few co-operations among various enterprises of different families 
(Suehiro 1992, p 390; East Asian Analytical Unit 1995, p 78). Although 
many Chinese-run firms have grown into huge conglomerates that 
cover many business areas, the founding family still keeps the ultimate 
rein. Afterward, firms under the same family umbrella overlap and 
compete, thereby leading to intra-family conflicts. In sum, co-operation 
is less likely in inter-family businesses, and co-operation frequently 
draws family complexity and contention in the intra-family enterprises.
III.  Firms’ Technological Capability Development and 
Innovation
Behind the low TFP growth rate and loss of Thailand’s industrial 
competitiveness is the limitation pertaining to technological upgrade 
and innovation at the firm level. Several studies of firms in Thailand 
since the 1980s have confirmed that most firms have grown without 
deepening their technological capabilities in the long run, and their 
technological learning has been very slow and passive (Bell and 
Scott-Kemmis 1985; Chantramonklasri 1985; Thailand Development 
Research Institute 2004; Dahlman and Brimble 1990; Tiralap 1990; 
Mukdapitak 1994; Lall 1998). According to a World Bank-commissioned 
study by Arnold et al. (2000), only a small minority of large subsidiaries 
of transnational corporations (TNCs), large domestic firms, and small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) have R&D capability, and the majority 
remains struggling with an increase in their design and engineering 
capability. For many SMEs, the key issue is much more concerned with 
strengthening additional basic operational capabilities, together with 
craft and technician capabilities for efficient acquisition, assimilation, 
and incremental upgrading of fairly standard technology. 
The slow technological capability development of Thai firms differs 
considerably from the development that characterized Japan, Korea, 
and Taiwan. Firms in these countries move rather rapidly from being 
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mere imitators to innovators. In the1960s, Japanese firms have become 
increasingly innovative, invested heavily in R&D, and relied minimally 
on importing foreign technologies (Odagiri and Goto 1993). In general, 
firms in Korea and Taiwan, where industrialization (beginning with 
import substitution) started relatively in the same period as in Thailand, 
are successful in increasing absorptive capacity (of foreign technology) 
and deepening indigenous technological capabilities in several industries 
(Amsden 1989; Kim 1993; Lall 1996; Hobday 1995; Kim 1997). For 
example, in the electronics industry, Korean and Taiwan firms climbed 
technological ladders by exploiting institutional mechanisms, such 
as providing assembly services as original equipment manufacturers 
(OEMs) and/or providing designs as own brand manufacturers (ODMs) 
to TNCs. Therefore, latecomer firms in such countries can acquire 
advanced technology and access demanding foreign markets (Hobday 
1995).
Nonetheless, after the economic crisis in 1997, a few interesting 
positive changes have occurred in the industrial sectors in Thailand.
(a)  Several large conglomerates, such as the CP Group and Siam 
Cement Group, increased their R&D activities. One large 
conglomerate alone invested 16millionUS$ on R&D in 1999. This 
development is due to the crisis have convinced the executives of 
these companies that long-term survival depends on deepening 
their technological and innovative capabilities. These companies 
cannot simply rely on importing off-the-shelf technologies and the 
knowledge necessary for simple production as they have executed 
previously.
(b)  Several small companies recently increased their technological 
efforts by collaborating with university R&D groups to lead in the 
market or seize the most profitable market section.
(c)  Recently, several subcontracting suppliers in the automobile 
and electronics industries were forced by their TNC customers/
partners to strengthen their efforts to modify product design 
and improve efficiency and be capable of absorbing the design 
and knowledge from foreign experts. To continue working with 
TNCs, several local suppliers in the automotive industry have 
been aiming to upgrade their production processes by introducing 
Industry 4.0-related technologies, such as robotics and artificial 
intelligence (Lee et al., forthcoming, 2019). 
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(d)  New start-up firms (less than 50 employees) that rely on their 
own design, engineering, or development activities emerged. These 
companies are managed by entrepreneurs who acquired strong 
R&D backgrounds while studying or working abroad. Many 
of them are “fabless” companies (Intarakumnerd et al. 2002). 
However, the pool of potential entrepreneurs is relatively small 
because the rate of enterprise creation per population is relatively 
low; moreover, scientists, engineers, and managers prefer to work 
in public agencies or large businesses (OECD 2011). 2
The low level of technological and innovative capabilities and passive 
learning of Thai firms are reflected by R&D and innovation community 
surveys. Surveys were conducted by the National Science and 
Technology Development Agency (NSTDA) and then the National Science 
Technology and Innovation Policy Office. R&D surveys were conducted 
annually, but the innovation surveys were conducted on 2003, 2008, 
2011, and 2014. The number of R&D-performing and innovating firms 
in the manufacturing and service sectors in 2014 were 27% and 23%, 
correspondingly (Table 1). This result shows moderate improvement 
in innovation performance of the firms in Thailand. This improvement 
corresponds to the positive changes after the financial crisis in 1997.
Nonetheless, Thailand’s performance remains relatively poor in 
2 Like previous surveys, the 2011 survey also followed the definitions of 
the Oslo Manual. However, additional descriptions of the different types of 
innovation were provided. Therefore, surveyed firms could recognize well when 
they implemented innovation. This situation may explain why the figures were 
higher in innovating firms than in previous surveys.
Table 1
Percentage of r&D-Performing anD innovating firms in thailanD’s innovation 
surveys
2003 2008 2011 2014
R&D-performing firms 6.0% 2.43% 7.96% 27%
Innovating firms 5.8% 4.24% 20.73%2 23%
Source:  Reports on R&D/Innovation Surveys 2003 and 2008 by the NSTDA and 
the R&D/Innovation Surveys for 2011 and 2014 by the National Science 
Technology and Innovation Policy Office
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relation to successful Asian countries. A comparison between the 
Thailand and Korea innovation surveys conducted in 2011–2012 
demonstrates the differences in terms of their respective innovative 
capabilities. Companies in Thailand lag far behind companies in Korea 
with respect to innovation. More than 40% of firms in Korea conducted 
innovations against approximately 6% in Thailand. Notably, a high 
share of companies in Korea performed product innovations. This result 
might indicate that companies in Thailand are at the stage where they 
would rather use their resources to improve production processes than 
the products themselves, which, in turn, could hint toward a rather 
OEM-oriented economy. TNCs and joint ventures in Thailand operate 
at the low end of the global value chain. Most of their products (67%) 
are manufactured in accordance with the design specifications of 
parent companies or those provided by external buyers and traders. 
Similarly, most of Thai-owned firms’ products (59%) are manufactured 
at the low end of the global value chain (Table 2). Simultaneously, 
few companies in Thailand perform product and process innovations, 
which, conversely, are very common in Korea. This disparity reflects the 
advanced innovation behavior of companies in Korea.
In terms of size, small firms tend to engage less in R&D and 
innovation activities than large ones, and, when the former do so, their 
activities tend to be less sophisticated. Conducting quality control 
or testing activities is quite common in Thailand because over two-
thirds of the surveyed firms performed these activities in 2011. Small 
firms were also minimally receptive and have decreased capabilities 
in absorbing external knowledge and technology. In general, few firms 
Table 2
tyPes of ProDucts by global value chain: year 2011
Type of firm
Types of products (% of total revenue)
Manufacturing 














Thai firms 9% 20% 16% 25% 30%
TNCs/Joint 
ventures
21% 28% 16% 17% 18%
Source:  Thailand Innovation Survey 2011, National Science Technology and 
Innovation Policy Office 
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conduct sophisticated R&D activities. Only 10% of SMEs performed in-
house R&D, whereas more than 25% of large firms did. 
In terms of R&D intensity, TNCs and Thai-owned firms are quite 
similar. They spent only approximately 0.1% of their total sales on R&D. 
This percentage is relatively lower than that of firms in other Asian NIE 
countries. The propensity of firms for performing R&D varied across 
sectors. The leading sectors were science-based industries, such as the 
chemical and electronics sectors, and resource-based industries, such 
as the food and rubber sectors. In-house R&D expenditure was largely 
devoted to the development of new or improved products (65%), rather 
than processes (22%). Nearly one-fifth of manufacturing firms had 
achieved innovation, in comparison with only 5% of service firms.
The main barriers to innovation were the lack of qualified personnel, 
the high cost of innovation, and the limited access to information on 
technology and markets. The corresponding cost was an important 
obstacle to innovation for small firms. Interestingly, the main sources 
of information used for innovation were the entities that interact with 
firms on a regular basis (i.e., customers, parent firms, and suppliers) 
and the Internet. Highly sophisticated sources of information, such 
as patent disclosures, public research institutions, and universities or 
business service providers, are minimally essential.
In terms of external collaboration, a horizontal relationship between 
firms in the same or related industries is considered unimportant by 
the surveyed firms. Co-operative consortiums among competing firms 
to research particular technology or products, such as those found in 
Japan or Taiwan, are rare in Thailand. Moreover, given the discussed 
weakness of intra-firm technological capabilities, innovation-centered 
interactions generated from such links are, therefore, limited. By 
contrast, firms tend to have further vertical collaboration with their 
customers and suppliers. 
University–industry linkages (UIL) in Thailand are weak. Firms do not 
regard universities and public research institutes as important sources 
of information and knowledge. They do not collaborate intensely with 
local universities and public research institutes (see more details in 
Intarakumnerd and Schiller 2009; Intarakumnerd et al. 2018). They also 
perceive technical support from local universities and public research 
institutes as relatively weak. Thus, most UIL projects are limited to 
consulting and technical services. Advanced projects occur only in 
several outstanding cases. However, interesting aspects are noted when 
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R&D-performing and innovating firms are analyzed separately or if 
different industrial sectors are compared:
•  R&D-performing and innovating firms have stronger UILs than 
non-R&D-performing and innovating firms. The former perceives 
universities and public research institutes as relatively important 
sources of knowledge and views the supports from universities and 
public research institutes in a positive light.
•  R&D-performing and innovating firms in science-based industries, 
which require highly sophisticated level of science and technology 
(S&T) capabilities for their R&D and innovation activities (e.g., 
petroleum/petrochemical, electrical machinery, telecommunication, 
computer sectors, and R&D services) have more intense 
collaboration with local universities and public research institutes 
than those in resource-based and labor-intensive industries. 
However, the food processing industry, a resource-based sector, also 
uses universities intensely as a knowledge source and for improving 
production processes.
•  Firms that cooperate with industry are mostly locally owned. 
Old companies are more likely linking up with universities than 
very young start-ups, thus contradicting the university spin-
off hypothesis that is valid for high-tech regions of industrialized 
countries. In Thailand, SMEs only cooperate with universities in 
very limited cases, especially those in science-based industries (e.g., 
chemical and pharmaceutical sectors) because most of SMEs do not 
perform any technology-intensive activities, such as R&D, design, 
and advanced engineering. Joint innovation activities are likely to 
occur with large local companies in traditional sectors. Within the 
public research sector, universities are more important knowledge 
sources than government research institutes.
IV. Ineffective STI Policy
In addition to the limitation of firms’ technological learning and 
innovation, the STI policies, especially those concerning industrial 
upgrading, are also largely accountable for Thailand’s middle-income 
trap. In the past 50 years, several changes had occurred in these 
policies, but the main ideas did not change significantly. These policies 
became long-term habits. Several of them became doctrine and mantra 
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of successive generations of policymakers. Such policies were officially 
documented in successive five-year National Economic and Social 
Development Plans, Policy Statements of the Government delivered 
to the Parliament, and other national plans, such as industry master 
plans and S&T plans. These policy habits differ from those in Asian 
countries that were successful in industrial upgrading. We will highlight 
these policies in comparison with those in successful Asian economies. 
Policy Habit # 1: R&D Promotion is the Most Important STI Policy
Many policymakers equate promotion of technology and innovation 
capability of the country with the promotion of R&D investment. 
The ratio of the gross expenditure on R&D (GERD) to the GDP is an 
important leading indicator used for formulating STI policy here. For 
example, according to the National STI Policy and Plan 2012–2021, the 
Thai government set a target to achieve 1% and 2% of GERD to GDP by 
2016 and 2021, respectively. 
Before the government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra 
(January 2001–September 2006), the S&T policy in Thailand had a 
narrow scope. It covered only four conventional functions, namely, 
R&D, human resource development, technology transfer, and S&T 
infrastructure development. This narrow scope of S&T was based on the 
so-called “technology-push” R&D model or “linear model of innovation,” 
that is, the results of R&D will be readily designed and engineered to 
become new processes and/or products set to be sold in the market. 
The model used to be popular after WWI and until the 1960s but faded 
away in other countries. Academics and policymakers in other countries 
realize that the innovation process is not automatic, and the failure rate 
can be high. The effective management of all actors (government, private 
sector, funding institutes and market, and academia) that participate 
in all relevant functions from R&D to design, engineering, testing, and 
marketing and the forward and backward interactions between these 
functions are necessary. 
Ultimately, for developing countries, R&D is typically not a primary 
source of innovation. This situation is due to firms in these countries 
have evolved as “learners” and not radical innovators by borrowing and 
improving technology that is already commercialized by innovating 
firms from developed countries (Amsden and Hikino 1993). Successful 
latecomer firms in Korea and Taiwan, before being able to produce 
118 SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
additional original innovations at present, developed strong capabilities 
for generating a “continuous incremental change” in technologies 
initially acquired from forerunner countries. In minimally successful 
late-comer firms elsewhere (including Thailand), accumulating this kind 
of technological capability within firms has been increasingly limited 
(Bell and Pavitt 1995). The World Bank’s study on Thailand (Arnold et 
al. 2000) stipulates that only a small minority of large subsidiaries of 
TNCs, large domestic firms, and SMEs have the capability for R&D, 
whereas the majority still struggles with an increase in their design 
and engineering capability. For many SMEs, the key issue is concerned 
with building additional basic operational capabilities, together with 
craft and technician capabilities for efficient acquisition, assimilation, 
and incremental upgrading of fairly standard technology. Therefore, the 
aspects of technology absorption capacity, design activities, engineering 
developments, experimentation, and training and exploration of 
markets for new products are more important than R&D as an input 
for technological progress of a country such as Thailand. Government 
policies should be geared toward enhancing firms’ capabilities in these 
areas. In 2015, the tax incentives provided by government agencies 
started to cover non-R&D innovation activities. Tax incentives offered 
by the Department of Revenue increased from 200% to 300% and 
expanded to cover firms’ expenditure on licensing in foreign technology 
to advance their product and process innovations. The Board of 
Investment (BOI)’s new “merit-based” investment promotion scheme 
introduced in 2017 also covered non-R&D technological upgrading 
activities, such as product design, packaging design, advance 
technology training, licensing fees of intellectual property rights, 
collaboration with universities, and development of local suppliers 
(Suchinai 2017). 
Policy Habit # 2: Firms Are the “Users” of STI Capabilities Generated by 
Universities and Public Research Institutes
Ultimately, the firms must compete internationally and not the 
universities and public research institutes. However, considering the 
influence of the linear model of innovation, the dominant orientation 
of policy and resource allocation for building technology development 
capabilities since the 1960s has been on the capabilities and resources 
of scientific, technological, and training institutions that were intended 
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to undertake technological activities “on behalf of firms.” Conversely, 
policy measures and resource allocations designed to strengthen 
the technological learning, technological capabilities, and innovative 
activities “within firms” and the knowledge flow among firms and 
between firms and other actors in innovation processes are rather 
minimal and ineffective (Arnold et al. 2000, p ix). 
Policy Habit # 3: Building Indigenous Technological and Innovative 
Capabilities Is Not a Major Economic Policy Objective 
In contrast to Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, S&T elements were not part 
of Thailand’s broader economic policies, namely, industrial, investment, 
trade and, to a lesser extent, education policies (Intarakumnerd et al. 
2002). The Ministry of Science and Technology, not being considered an 
economic ministry until 2016, has more roles in promoting technology 
development than economic agencies, such as the Ministry of Industry 
(Arnold et al. 2000: vii). This imbalance is very different from the 
NIEs and Japan, where economic organizations, such as the Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry of Japan (Johnson 1982), the 
Economic Development Board (EDB) of Singapore (Wong 1999), the 
Economic Planning Board of Korea (Chang 1997), have valuable roles 
in the array of policy and institutional support for industrial technology 
development.
Trade policy, for which tariff is the most important instrument in 
Thailand, was not used strategically to promote technological learning 
similar to NIEs (Amsden 1989; Chang 1994; Lall 1996). Alternatively, 
trade policy was considerably influenced by macroeconomic policies, 
such as reducing domestic demand for imports during a balance of 
payment deficit. The Ministry of Finance, a dominant agency that 
controlled the policy, had limited knowledge or experience of industry 
and industrial restructuring (Lauridsen 2002). The industrial policy 
of Thailand did not focus on developing indigenous technological 
capability as an integral factor in industrialization (Sripaipan, 
Vanichseni, and Mukdapitak, 1999, p 37). In 2016, the Thailand 4.0 
Plan was introduced. This plan aims to change the country into a value-
based and innovation-driven economy by emphasizing the promotion 
of technology, creativity, and innovation in focused industries. 
Subsequently, the Law on National Competitive Enhancement for 
Targeted Industries was enacted. This Act seeks to promote an 
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investment that is consistent with Thailand 4.0. Incentives are provided 
for supporting projects of the targeted industries. Notably, in addition 
to tax incentives, the Fund for Enhancement of Competitiveness for 
Targeted Industries was established with the government seed money 
of US$ 285 million for investment projects engaged in R&D or human 
resource development in specific areas.
Nonetheless, except the automotive industry, no reciprocal 
performance-based criteria (e.g., export and local value-added and 
technological upgrading targets) were set for providing state incentives, 
similar to those found in Korea and Taiwan (Amsden 1989, 2001; 
Amsden and Chu 2003). For example, investment promotion privileges 
were provided once approved.
The National Research and Innovation Policy Council chaired by the 
Prime Minister was established in 2016. The Council aims is to integrate 
previously separate research policy with STI policy, implant STI issues 
to broad economic policies, and enhance cross-ministry coordination. 
Members of this council comprise not only the Minister of Science 
and Technology but also counterparts from key economic ministries. 
The National Research Council of Thailand under the Prime Minister 
Office and the National Science Technology and Innovation Policy 
Office under the Ministry of Science and Technology work together as 
a joint secretariat. The evaluation of this council in terms of achieving 
its objective might be too early. However, previous supra-ministerial 
committees and councils failed to achieve their goals because the Prime 
Minister himself did not really preside the meeting, the meetings were 
infrequent, and mechanisms for executing, monitoring, and evaluating 
resolutions (once approved by such committees) were lacking. 
Policy Habit # 4: Selective Policies for Particular Sectors or Clusters as 
Market Distortions
Economic policies were heavily influenced by the World Bank’s 
“market-friendly” approach to industrialization. Moreover, given the 
neo-classical economics inclination of leading Thai technocrats, such 
policies were limited to the so-called “functional” intervention, such 
as promoting infrastructure building, general education, and export 
push in general. Virtually no selective policy measures, such as special 
credit allocation and tariff protection, targeted particular industries or 
clusters because these measures were considered market distortion by 
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mainstream economists. An exception was the automobile industry. 
Despite relatively liberal policy on such industry, the Thai government 
successively raised its local content requirements for automobile 
manufacturers who invest in Thailand.
A major change in policy came under the Thaksin government 
(2001–2006). For the first time, the Thai government had serious 
“selective” policies that address specific sectors and clusters. The 
government declared five strategic sectors, which Thailand should 
pursue: automotive, food, tourism, fashion, and software. Clear visions 
were directed to the five sectors, namely, Kitchen of the World (food 
cluster), Detroit of Asia (automotive cluster), Asia Tropical Fashion, 
World Graphic Design and Animation Center (software cluster), and 
Asia Tourism Capital. The cluster concept was introduced and went 
considerably beyond the linear model of innovation because the 
concept focused on interactive and collective learning among firms 
and between firms and other actors in close geographical proximity. 
Thailand was divided into 19 geographical areas. Each area had to plan 
and implement its own cluster strategy by focusing on a few strategic 
products or services. Every area was supervised by the so-called “CEO 
Governors,” who were given authority by the central government 
to act similarly to provincial CEOs. At the local level, the cluster 
concept was applied to increase the capacity of grassroots economy 
for “community-based clusters,” especially to help the “One Tambon 
One Product’ ” initiative. Nonetheless, the actual implementation of the 
concept had mixed results given the misinterpretation of the concept 
of policy practitioners at the implementation level, policy discontinuity, 
inadequate trust and participation of concerned actors, and lack of 
champions in the private sector in several cases (Intarakumnerd 2006). 
Furthermore, the Thaksin government did not sufficiently focus on 
long-term industrial upgrading beyond short-term and politically-
branded schemes. For example, the said regime scraped the most 
ambitious upgrading plan, that is, the industrial restructuring project 
(IRP), which was initiated by the previous government, and went 
through extensive consultation processes with the private sector. The 
IRP aimed to upgrade 13 sectors with 8 sets of measures that range 
from equipment modernization to labor skills and product design (Doner 
2009).
Since 2015, the BOI’s “Super Cluster” incentive scheme was 
introduced to upgrade the existing five industries and encourage the 
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emergence of five new industries for the future development of Thailand. 
The following two new cluster-like mega projects were implemented: the 
Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC) and Food Innopolis. The EEC consists 
of three Eastern provinces (Rayong, Chonburi, and Chachoengsao) with 
a combined area of 13,285 square kilometers. The EEC will invest US$ 
43 billion during the next five years, mostly through FDIs. Moreover, 
the EEC is intended to accommodate investments in 10 targeted 
industries that are important for Thailand’s future. These industries are 
next-generation cars, smart electronics, affluent medical and wellness 
tourism, agriculture and biotechnology, food, robotics for industry, 
logistics and aviation, biofuels and biochemicals, digital services, and 
medical services. Private enterprises that invest in the EEC will receive 
a super incentive promotion package, which exceeds the current BOI 
incentives, including very preferable corporate and personal income 
tax privileges, long-term land lease for investors, a fast-tracked 
environmental impact assessment, and using foreign currencies in 
trade directly without having to exchange them into Thai Baht. 
Food Innopolis is located at the Thailand Science Park under 
the NSTDA. This project aims to position Thailand as a global food 
innovation hub in the international food industry. The expected 
availability of resources for Food Innopolis include 3,000 researchers, 
10,000 students in Food Science and Technology, 9,000 food factories, 
150 food research laboratories, 20 pilot plants, and 70 universities. Tax-
based incentives include the exemption of corporate income tax for 
up to 8 years, with an additional 50% reduction for 5 years, and the 
exemption of import duty on machinery. Non-tax incentives include 
the permission to own land and facilitation of visas and work permits. 
However, whether the two initiatives will be successful or not depends 
on implementation, which is typically problematic in Thailand given 
the lack of long-term commitment and coordination between concerned 
agencies. 
Given the general scarcity and late introduction of selective policies, 
few institutions were founded to support the development of indigenous 
technological and innovative capabilities of firms in specific sectors. 
Most research institutes in the country can be described as “jacks 
of all trade but masters of none.” They have too many missions, 
including assisting industry, building S&T manpower, educating the 
general public on S&T, and helping disadvantaged groups of society. 
They frequently cover extensive technologies without specific targets 
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for particular industries, and their industry linkages are rather weak. 
Furthermore, sectoral promotion institutes under the Ministry of 
Industry, such as the Thai Textile Institute, Thailand Automotive 
Institute, and National Food Institute, are preoccupied with their 
own financial survival given a short-sighted policy design, which 
requires these institutes to become financially independent after being 
established as public organizations for 5 years. Consequently, such 
institutes must rely on short-term and money-making activities, such 
as training to generate quick income at the expense of activities that 
promote long-term capability development of firms in the sector. The 
situation in Thailand differs considerably from countries like Taiwan 
and Korea where many government research institutes with clear-cut 
missions are dedicated to strengthening the technological capabilities of 
firms in particular sectors and sub-sectors or even for specific products. 
Policy Habit # 5: TNCs Should Be Left Alone
An institutionalized belief among policymakers is that the main 
target of government policies should be Thai-owned firms, especially 
SMEs. Beyond providing tax incentives to attract FDI to bring in foreign 
exchanges and generate employment, TNCs should be left alone. This 
notion is due to policy makers assume that a) TNCs are footloose 
because they can leave Thailand to invest in other countries as they 
want; b) they keep high-value creation and value-added activities, such 
as R&D and product design at home; and c) all important decisions 
will be made at the headquarters of TNCs, and policymakers in host 
countries only slightly influence such decisions. These assumptions 
are less true these days. In contrast to portfolio investment, FDI is 
much more difficult to move. Local conditions (e.g., availability of 
knowledgeable workers and skilled labor, capabilities of local suppliers, 
size of the local market, sophistication of local demand, and working 
environment) vary among countries and are difficult to imitate. 
Moreover, the world’s largest TNCs are engaging increasingly in R&D 
and innovative activities outside their home countries. Moreover, TNCs 
are currently setting up R&D facilities outside developed countries 
that exceed adaptation for local markets; such developments occur 
increasingly in several developing countries. The R&D of TNCs’ affiliates 
target global markets and are integrated into the core innovation 
efforts of TNCs (Patel and Pavitt 2000). Between 1994 and 2002, the 
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developing-country share of all overseas R&D by American TNCs 
has increased from 7.5% to 13%. For example, foreign-owned R&D 
laboratories in China has reached approximately 700 (UNCTAD 2005).
Furthermore, several recent studies (Ariffin and Bell 1997; Marin 
and Bell 2006; and Hobday and Rush 2007) have emphasized that 
subsidiaries of TNCs in several countries, including the electronics 
industry in Thailand, have more autonomy in decision-making than 
in the perceived conventional wisdom. If correctly formulated and 
implemented, then the policies of host countries can influence TNCs to 
invest in technologically sophisticated activities and generate spillover 
effects on local economies. Similar to Thailand, Singapore is another 
country where FDI has been very much encouraged. However, Singapore 
has specific government measures in generating spillover effects from 
FDI in terms of developing local technological capabilities. For example, 
in the 1970s, the Local Industry Upgrading Program implemented by 
Singapore’s EDB specifically aimed to exploit TNCs’ knowledgeable and 
experienced engineers to train employees of local firms in developing 
skills that were considered “critical” for technologically upgrading high-
priority industrial sectors.
However, no such explicit and pro-active link exists between 
promoting FDI and upgrading the local technological capability in 
Thailand partially due to conventional wisdom on the roles of TNCs. 
Until 2004, the BOI launched the “Skill, Technology and Innovation” 
incentive for firms that invest in R&D, employ university graduates 
in S&T, and train their personnel and those of suppliers. Despite this 
initiative, the number of projects approved under this scheme has 
been relatively low, and the incentive for training suppliers’ employees, 
the most deliberate attempt to generate spillover effects from FDI, 
was abolished (Chokdee Kaewsang, Deputy Director General, Board 
of Investment, personal communication, July 10, 2007). Hopefully, 
the new BOI merit-based incentive scheme introduced in 2017, 
as mentioned previously, can result in close knowledge-intensive 
collaboration between TNCs and local firms. The BOI has been weak 
in terms of monitoring and evaluating its granted projects in the past, 
and assessing “merit-based” projects, which require high organizational 
capability and dedication, has been a tall order for the BOI.
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Policy Habit # 6: Government Grants and Direct Subsidies to Promote 
Firms’ Technology Learning Should Be Constrained, if not Prohibited. 
Advantages and disadvantages are inherent in the different forms of 
incentives, including tax concessions, loans, and grants. Tax incentives 
have the benefit of being non-discriminatory, that is, open to all firms 
that satisfy the stated criteria and administration is relatively simple. 
By contrast, grants are generally more effective for promoting focal 
activities prioritized by the government; in contrast to tax incentives, 
grants are less likely to subsidize activity that will have occurred in any 
case (Turpin et al. 2002). 
In Japan, the government aimed to create “intellectual clusters,” 
that is, regional-based clusters of universities, public R&D institutions, 
relevant institutes, and knowledge-intensive core companies. The 
central government provided a five-year financial subsidy to the cluster 
plans that were initiated by local governments together with local 
universities and firms and that subsequently passed the selection 
process. The goal was to foster interaction between the original 
technological seeds of the public research organizations and universities 
and the business requirements of regional companies to create a chain 
of technological innovations and new industries (MEXT 2002). In other 
Asian newly industrializing countries, such as Taiwan, Singapore, and 
Malaysia, grants were used effectively to promote “specific” activities (see 
more detailed discussion on Intarakumnerd and Wonglimpiyarat 2012).
By contrast, grant schemes in Thailand to promote specific or 
targeted activities that aim at enhancing technological learning of 
firms were rather limited. This situation is due to the aforementioned 
dominance of the notion of market distortion and the obstructing and 
rigid government regulations that emerged out of the fear of corruption 
and cronyism. Therefore, Thailand is missing opportunities to use an 
effective and targeted policy tool and must rely only on tax incentives, a 
blunt but easy-to-handle instrument. 
Policy Habit # 7: Increasing the Number of Graduates at the Post-
Graduate Level Is the Most Critical S&T Human Resource Development 
Issue
Policymakers, especially those who came from scientific disciplines 
at universities, have strongly believed that the most critical issue in 
S&T human resource development is the considerable increase in 
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the numbers of master’s degree and Ph.D. graduates. This perception 
may be true for other reasons, such as teaching and basic research at 
universities and public research institutes, but several studies (TDRI 
2004; Chalamwong 2007; NESDB 2007b) have confirmed that firms, 
local and foreign, in Thailand, do not considerably require graduates 
at the postgraduate level. Alternatively, their main concern is on 
the quantity of “qualified” bachelor-degree and vocational-certificate 
holders. Production-based firms and those conducting R&D basically 
require only bachelor degrees. 
An interesting example is Toyota Motor, which recently started 
to perform design and development work in Thailand by setting up 
the Technical Center of Toyota Motor Asia Pacific Engineering & 
Manufacturing (TMAP-EM) in August 2003 at Samutprakarn Province. 
The Centre focuses on material development, design, and engineering 
to fit local requirements and test vehicles and their parts. The main 
difference from their production subsidiaries is that the Centre employs 
engineers more than technicians. Notably, more than 90% of engineers 
are bachelor-degree holders. Less than 10% are master’s degree 
graduates, and only two employees have Ph.Ds. Executives of the Centre 
believe that bachelor-degree holders are sufficiently qualified to conduct 
development work at their organization, and increasing the number 
of postgraduate engineers in the future is unnecessary. Furthermore, 
engineers, regardless of educational background, must perform the 
same tasks and be trained in-house locally and in Japan for 1½ years. 
The Centre executives believe that, despite their satisfactory engineering 
knowledge, Thai engineers lack language proficiency, creativity, and 
group discussion ability; these skills are indispensable qualifications for 
research engineers.
Overemphasis on university postgraduate level comes at the expense 
of others. Thus, the quality of vocational education has been largely 
neglected by policymakers. As an industrializing latecomer, Thailand 
has a window of opportunity to exploit and upgrade technologies 
already developed by forerunner countries. To exploit such an 
opportunity, qualified engineers and technicians at the shop-floor 
level are necessary inputs for firms’ technological absorption capacity 
and “incremental” innovation at the time of technological catching 
up. Although the Vocational Education Act and relevant laws exist, 
the lack of focus and the negative societal value toward vocational 
education deter the sufficient accumulation of vocational students 
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and technicians in the manufacturing sector. Vocational students 
and graduates are perceived as inferior human resources relative to 
students and graduates in general studies. This notion is different from 
that in Japan, Taiwan, and Korea, where the importance of vocational 
education has been highly regarded by their governments and viewed 
positively by societies, especially during their technological catching-up 
period when innovations were mostly incremental and emerging from 
factories’ shop floors. “Project-execution” capabilities are important for 
latecomer firms to enter new industries (Amsden and Hikino 1993). 
Politics of STI Policies 
Why were the aforementioned seven habits so persistent in Thailand? 
An important answer lies in the perceptions of Thai policymakers. Two 
groups of Thai policymakers dominate STI and industrial development 
policies. The first group is the neoclassical economists-cum-bureaucrats; 
they are called “technocrats” in key economic ministries, who strongly 
oppose state intervention (especially selective and vertical industrial 
upgrading policies). The emergence and empowerment of technocrats 
were very much shaped by the sociopolitical circumstances in Thailand. 
Technocrats gained authority in policymaking during long-term 
successive military and semi-democratic regimes. The trend started 
with the military coup by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat in 1957. Several 
macroeconomic agencies, such as the Budget Bureau, Office of the 
Fiscal Policy, BOI, and NESDB were dominated by technocrats (mostly 
graduates from top universities’ mainstream economic departments 
in the United States and the United Kingdom) and were established 
shortly after (Doner 2009). Together with military generals, technocrats 
dominated policymaking and implementing processes during the 
governments of Field Marshals Sarit and Tanom in 1958–1973. Then, 
successively elected governments were too short-lived to initiate any 
long-lasting policies that differed from those of the technocrats. The 
military returned to power again in 1976, and the technocrats enjoyed 
another heyday during General Prem’s administration (1980–1988). The 
subsequently elected governments were also short-lived, although the 
influence of technocrats diminished. The 1997 Constitution empowered 
elected governments and brought the Thaksin administration into 
power with an overwhelming majority in the parliament. As noted, the 
Thaksin regime initiated several policies, which were clearly different 
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from those of the technocrats. The two military coups in 2006 and 2014 
were attempts of the establishment (including the technocrats) to regain 
authority in the policymaking process (see more detailed discussion 
on the rise and fall of the Thai technocrats in Phongpaichit and Baker 
2014 and Kanchoochat 2016). 
Another powerful group is the scientists-cum-policymakers who 
were in charge of making science and technology policies. Many of 
them were well-known university professors and executives who later 
became administrators of national-level public research institutes and 
funding agencies. These policymakers had amicable relationships with 
the economic technocrats and also gained authority during military and 
semi-democratic regimes. They strongly believed in the linear model 
of innovation and considerably focused on science-push policies that 
emphasize R&D and S&T human resource development. This situation 
differs from that in Japan and in successful East Asian NIEs, such 
as Korea and Taiwan, where the policymaking process is typically 
controlled by engineering and economic development “technocrats” who 
believe in the importance of industrial and technology upgrades “within” 
firms (Amsden 1989; Johnson 1992; Lauridsen 1999, 2008).
V. Conclusion
The competitiveness of a country is not an extensive phenomenon. 
Such competitiveness requires continuous upgrading and, at 
times, major transformation. Factors that previously underpinned 
competitiveness may become the ones that reduce competitiveness in 
the future. Therefore, the ability of a country to learn to create new 
factors is crucial for maintaining its position in global competition. 
Thailand was once recognized as a high-performing NIE. The country 
could have been successful in industrial catching-up with the West, 
similar to the accomplishments of Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore. From 2014, the new normal growth rate in Thailand has 
been only approximately 2%–3% annually. The middle-income trap 
became a major concern among Thailand’s policymakers. A major 
reason for this concern is the relatively low technological learning of 
firms in Thailand, for TNCs and Thai-owned firms, in the past 40 years 
of the country’s industrialization. Nonetheless, after the financial crisis 
in 1997, certain improvements were implemented; for example, TNCs 
and large local firms started to invest more in building up than in 
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sophisticated technological capabilities in product and process design, 
advanced engineering, and R&D. This development is demonstrated by 
an increase in the number of firms that perform R&D and innovation 
in recent innovation surveys. Nonetheless, these improvements were 
lopsided. Most firms, especially SMEs, remained relatively weak. 
If Thailand aimed to overcome the middle-income trap, then this 
country requires many additional innovative firms as drivers toward a 
knowledge-intensive and competitive economy. 
On the government side, the seven STI policy habits are detrimental 
for the survival, let alone the prosperity, of Thailand in the learning 
economy. Thus, breaking away from these habits and thinking 
alternatively are crucial. The enhancement of firms’ technological 
and innovative capabilities should be the center of STI policies. 
Furthermore, policies should aim at strengthening firms’ innovative 
capabilities beyond only R&D. Production, engineering, design, 
branding, and other approaches required to realize innovation should 
be considered. Additional targeted and differentiated policy measures 
for various industrial sectors, geographical clusters, and even products 
should be designed and implemented. Technological upgrade and 
innovation of firms should be a major objective of economic policies in 
terms of investment and trade promotion, industrial development, and 
education. Policies to leverage TNCs in terms of technology transfer and 
enhance the capabilities of local firms should be thoroughly examined 
and applied. Vocational education should be strengthened, and policy 
instruments beyond tax incentives should be allowed if appropriate and 
effective. All these policy changes required transforming the mindsets of 
policymakers and perhaps broad political changes, which minimized the 
influences of neoclassical economists-cum-technocrats and scientists 
who have dominated Thailand’s mainstream economic development and 
STI policies for several decades. 
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